The Structural School
The first attempts to write the history of a scientific discipline often presage its imminent senescence. And so the appearance a year ago of the collection of autobiographical essays entitled, Phage and the Origins of Molecular Biology (1) is probably symptomatic of the approaching decline of molecular biology, only yesterday an avant-garde but today definitely a workaday field. The essays in this book were written by some 30-odd actual or former bacteriophage workers who, at one time or another over the past 30 years, had been associated with Max Delbriick, to whom this book is dedicated on his 60th birthday. My decision to continue the historiographic celebration of the decline of molecular biology was prompted by reading some, in the main very friendly, reviews of this book. For these reviews revealed to me that, though the names of its leading figures and their achievements are now known to most schoolboys, the genesis and nature of molecular biology, and particularly its philosophical origins, deserve more extensive discussion.
Among these reviews was one written by John C. Kendrew (2), who offers some deep insights into the nature of our field. Kendrew, supremely legitimated for this reviewing assignment as editor-in-chief of the Journal of Molecular Biology, begins his appreciation of Phage and the Origins of Molecular Biology by asking what molecular biology actually is. He points out that he is aware of the biochemists' view that socalled molecular biology is naught but the unlicensed practice of biochemistry. But, Kendrew writes, "molecular biologists themselves are by no means unanimous about the nature of their subject. To anyone brought up in the British school of molecular biology, as the present reviewer was, it is a little odd to find in nearly every contribution 390 to this book the explicit or implicit assumption that molecular biology had its only real beginnings with the phage group, and that the central theme of the subject is biological information." This emphasis on information, particularly on genetics, is odd because W. T. Astbury, one of the originators and first propagandizers of the term molecular biology, defined it as follows (3):
It [molecular biology] is concerned particularly with the forms of biological molecules and with the evolution, exploitation and ramification of these forms in the ascent to higher and higher levels of organization. Molecular biology is predominantly three-dimensional and structuralwhich does not mean, however, that it is merely a refinement of morphology. It must at the same time inquire into genesis and function.
Thus, Astbury's definition does not even mention biological information or genetics. But, by the time the term molecular biology had become popular, in the 1950's, and many a research institute and university department had been organized under that name [though, as Astbury wistfully reported later (4), never his own], its meaning had evidently widened to include also molecular genetics. And, as Kendrew points out, though molecular geneticists are interested in such matters as the DNA double helix, their interest in the structure is not "geometrical so much as topological: the one-dimensional [rather than three-dimensional] nature of the information store and the role of the specific pairs of nitrogenous bases in replication." Thus there have existed, and there still exist, two schools of molecular biologists-structurists and informationists, three-dimensionists and one-dimensionists, who, "although they listen politely enough to each other's seminars, have less to say to each other in terms of real intellectual communication than one might expect."
The best explanation for why both schools ultimately came around to adopting the neologism molecular biology seems to have been offered by Francis Crick (5):
I myself was forced to call myself a molecular biologist because when inquiring clergymen asked me what I did, I got tired of explaining that I was a mixture of crystallographer, biophysicist, biochemist, and geneticist, an explanation which in any case they found too hard to grasp.
Thus there is probably little point in now arguing about any precise a posteriori definition of molecular biology. But, its schism into two main schools, to which Kendrew drew attention in his excellent review, is worth reflecting on. It is my opinion that this schism was immanent in a profound difference in attitude of the founders of the two schools toward the relation of physics to biology, a difference which was to engender also a highly differentiated attitude towards biochemistry. Not only did the one-dimensional, or informational, school have nothing in common with biochemistry but its early practitioners were positively hostile to biochemistry. The three-dimensional or structural school, however, can be properly thought of as a branch of biochemistry, whose basic working assumptions concerning biology it shared. This structural or, according to Kendrew, British, school, corresponding to Astbury's definition of molecular biology in the strict sense, can be considered to have descended from W. H. Bragg and W. L. Bragg. The Braggs, father and son, had invented x-ray crystallography in 1912 and then founded a school of crystallographers that made Britain the home of molecular structure. As success came in the determination of the structure of ever more complicated molecules, these crystallographers became sufficiently emboldened to train their x-ray cameras also on molecules of biological importance. For they had acceded to the idea that the physiological function of the cell can be understood only in terms of the three-dimensional configuration of its elements. Among the first of the Bragg pupils to enter this line of work were Astbury Pauling's success was due in part to a novel approach to structure determination, in which guesswork and model building played a much greater role than they did in the more straightforward, analytical procedure of more conventional crystallographers. Pauling had decided some years earlier that it ought to be possible to deduce the secondary structure of the polypeptide chain from a knowledge of the exact spatial coordinates of the peptide bond, and he had, therefore, concentrated his x-ray crystallographic analyses on the structural determination of simple oligopeptides. And once the exact structural coordinates of these peptides were at his disposal, Pauling worked out the a-helix from first principles. Great triumph that it was, the discovery of the a-helix did not immediately suggest to anyone very many new ideas about proteins-how they work, or how they are made. It did not seem to open new vistas to the imagination, or to suggest many experiments, other than to show how very far one can go by use of the methods of structural analysis that Pauling had employed.
Meanwhile, in W. L. Bragg's laboratory in Cambridge, Max Perutz and Kendrew had been working on the structures of the two proteins hemoglobin and myoglobin. Their progress had been rather slow, since, in view of the rather limited tools available at that time, the task they had cut out for themselves was immensely difficult and complex. Pauling's brilliant success is said to have come as a bit of a shock to 26 APRIL 1968 the Cambridge molecular biologists, but they continued on undeterred. The application of the heavy-atom isomorphous replacement technique to the analysis of protein structure and the availability of ever more potent computers for mathematical analysis of the x-ray photographs presently allowed Perutz and Kendrew to work out the complete tertiary structure of their respective proteins.
Without wishing in the least to minimize the magnitude of these extraordinary achievements of structural molecular biology, I give it as my view that their influence on general biology was not revolutionary. It was most important to learn, of course, that the polypeptide chain really does fold in such a way as to bring its hydrophobic amino acids into the inside, and its hydrophilic amino acids to the outside, of the molecule. Furthermore, knowledge of the spatial arrangements of the atoms of these two respiratory proteins will undoubtedly be of enormous help in future efforts to understand the physicochemical basis of the still rather mysterious interaction of the oxygen molecule with the heme iron of the two proteins. Indeed, a detailed understanding of the catalytic action of any enzyme will most probably issue from the precise determination of tertiary and quaternary structures of its polypeptide chains.
After the fact and in retrospect it seems plausible to conclude that the largely nonrevolutionary influence of the structural school on general biology derived from its preoccupation with structure rather than information. It is my belief that this preoccupation reflected a down-to-earth view of the relation of physics to biology-namely, that all biological phenomena, no matter what their complexity, can ultimately be accounted for in terms of conventional physical laws. For, since the study of molecular structure was obviously one domain in which physics could make significant contributions to biology, the decision to focus on structure was an eminently rational one 30 years ago. In contrast, working on the physical basis of biological information must have seemed more of a pie-in-the-sky activity, for there was then hardly any common ground between genetics, on the one hand, and physics and chemistry, on the other. And so the choice of genetics as the focal point of the informational school turns out to have had a rather different, or even diametrically opposite, intellectual origin. Whereas the structural molecular biologists operated under the entirely reasonable assumption that physics can make many significant -contributions to biology, some of the early informational molecular biologists were motivated by the fantastic and wholly unconventional notion that biology might make significant contributions to physics.
The Informational School
For just when old-fashioned vitalism was rapidly disappearing from intellectually enlightened circles, the idea that some biological phenomena might turn out to be not accountable wholly in terms of conventional physical concepts was fashioned by Niels Bohr. The difficulty inherent in trying to understand life in physical terms is, according to Bohr, "that the conditions holding for biological and physical researches are not directly comparable, since the necessity of keeping the object of investigation alive imposes a restriction on the former, which finds no counterpart in the latter. Thus we should doubtless kill an animal if we tried to carry the investigation of its organs so far that we could describe the role played by single atoms in vital functions." Thus there seems to exist for the living animal an "uncertainty principle" formally analogous to that of the electron, in that "there must remain an uncertainty as regards the physical condition to which [the organism is] subjected, and the idea suggests itself that the minimal freedom we must allow the organism in this respect is just large enough to hide its ultimate secrets from us. On this view, the existence of life must be considered as an elementary fact that cannot be explained, but must be taken as a starting point in biology, in a similar way as the quantum of action, which appears as an irrational element from the point of view of classical mechanical physics, taken together with the existence of the elementary particles, forms the foundation of atomic physics. The asserted impossibility of a physical or chemical explanation of the function peculiar to life would in this sense be analogous to the insufficiency of the mechanical analysis for the understanding of the stability of atoms." These ideas of Bohr's would evidently put the relation of physics to biology on a new footing.
That genetics was, in fact, a domain of biological inquiry in which physical and chemical explanations might turn out to be "insufficient" in Bohr's sense was spelled out in 1935 by Bohr's pupil Max Delbriick (7). Delbriick points out that "whereas in physics all measurements must in principle be traced back to measurements of place and time, there is hardly a case in which the fundamental concept of genetics, the character difference, can be expressed meaningfully in terms of absolute units." Thus, Delbriick thought, one could take the view "that genetics is autonomous and must not be mixed up with physicochemical conceptions. Schrodinger opens with the comforting statement that "the obvious inability of present-day physics and chemistry to account [for the events which take place in a living organism] is no reason at all for doubting that they can be accounted for by those sciences." Since, as Schridinger points out next, organisms are large as compared to atoms, there is no reason why they should not obey exact physical laws. And even the peculiar quality of living matter-namely, that it "evades decay to equilibrium"-does not put it beyond the pale of thermodynamics, since organisms evidently feed on "negative entropy," whose ultimate source is the sun. No, the real problem requiring explanation is the physical basis of genetic information. For, while the genes are evidently responsible for the order that an organism manifests, their dimensions are not very large relative to those of atoms. How, then, do the genes resist the fluctuations to which they should be subject? How, wonders Schrodinger, has the tiny gene of the Hapsburg lip managed to preserve its specific structure, and hence its information content, for centuries while being maintained at a temperature 310?K above absolute zero? Following Delbriick's then 10-year-old proposal that this stability derives from the atoms of the gene "molecule" staying put in energy wells, Schrodinger proposes that genes preserve their structure because the chromosome that carries them is an aperiodic crystal. These large aperiodic crystals are composed of a succession of a small number of isomeric elements, the exact nature of the succession representing the hereditary code. It requires no deep psychological insights to appreciate that the sort of romantic who would be attracted to working in biology because of the opportunity to search for "other laws of physics" is a rather different type from the sort of solid citizen who is confident that everything, however complex, can be eventually explained within the framework of conventional physics.
The philosophy of the search for "other laws" was spelled out in further detail by Delbruiick (9) in a speech he gave in 1949, entitled "A Physicist Looks at Biology." Delbriick explains, first of all, what he believes to be a fundamental difference between physics and biology. Whereas the aim of physics is the discovery of universal laws, biologists cannot reasonably aspire to any such aim, since "any one cell, embodying as it does the record of a billion years of evolution, represents more an historical than a physical event. ... You cannot expect to explain so wise an old bird in a few simple words." After discussing the relation of classical physics to quantum physics as an object lesson for biology, Delbriick states Bohr's (and his) belief that, "just as we find features of the atom-its stability for instancewhich are not reducible to mechanics, we may find features of the living cell which are not reducible to atomic physics, but whose appearance stands in a complementary relation to those of atomic physics." Delbruck admits that he is aware that these views might be considered very dangerous, since they are susceptible to naive misinterpretation and could inspire either unnecessary defeatism or wild and unreasonable vitalistic speculations. Nevertheless, he asserts, they can be justified on the grounds that the suggestion of a complementarity situation in biology has been the prime motive for the interest in biology of "at least one physicist." Delbriick concludes his speech with a homily that accounts for the, at first sight, surprising tend- 26 APRIL 1968 ency of the early molecular geneticists to look down on biochemistry. Biochemistry, Delbriick thought, is not likely to be very useful for gaining an understanding of the really important matters in biology:
He [the physicist] may be told that the only real access of atomic physics is through biochemistry. Listening to the story of modern biochemistry he might become persuaded that the cell is a sack full of enzymes acting on the substrates converting thera through various intermediate stages either into cell substance or into waste products. . . . The enzymes must be situated in their proper strategic positions to perform their duties in a wellregulated fashion. They in turn must be synthesized and must be brought into position by maneuvers which are not yet understood, but which, at first sight at least, do not necessarily seem to differ in nature from the rest of biochemistry . . . And yet this program of explaining the simple through the complex smacks suspiciously of the program of explaining atoms in terms of complex mechanical models. It looks sane until paradoxes crop up and come into sharper focus, and this will not happen until the behavior of living cells has been carried into far greater detail. This analysis should be done on the cell's own terms and theories should be formulated without fear of contradicting molecular physics. I believe that it is in this direction that physicists will show the greatest zeal and will create a new intellectual approach to biology which would lend meaning to the ill-used term biophysics.
The Romantic Phase
In 1938 Delbriick started his work with bacteriophages, because he had realized that bacteriophages should make ideal objects for the study of biological self-replication, and hence of the physical basis of heredity. And thus opened the first of three phases in the history of the informational school of molecular biology-the romantic phase, whose spiritual hallmark was to be the quest for the physical basis of the gene. Delbriick soon met Salvador Luria and Alfred Hershey, and with this meeting the American phage group came into being. The members of this group were united by a single common goal-the desire to understand how, during the brief half-hour latent period, the simple bacteriophage particle achieves its own hundredfold self-reproduction within the bacterial host cell. The initial growth of this group was rather slow, but after Delbriick organized the first annual summer bacteriophage course at Cold Spring Harbor to spread the new gospel among physicists and chemists, growth was more rapid. Nevertheless, by 1952, which was to be the last year of the romantic phase, the phage group still numbered only three or four dozen people.
Delbriick, Luria, and Hershey dominated this first, romantic phase, though during that same period several other people had, of course, made discoveries which equaled in importance anything that these three had found (10). When one looks back now on that first phase, a curious fact emerges: though the immediate conclusions drawn from the results of the experiments of the romantic phase were almost always right, the more general and really interesting speculations built upon these first-order conclusions were mostly wrong. Thus the outstanding accomplishment of the romantic phase was the introduction into microbial genetics of previously unknown standards of experimental design, deductive logic, and data evaluation. These procedures had led to final and definitive settlement of matters that had been under dispute for 10 or more years, such as whether phages are really viruses that multiply autonomously within their bacterial host cells, whether bacteria and phages really sport spontaneous hereditary variants, whether phages really enter a noninfectious eclipse phase during their intracellular growth, and whether lysogenic bacteria really perpetuate hereditarily the capacity to produce infective phage. They had also led to the discovery of important new phenomena, such as multiplicity reactivation of irradiated phage genomes and genetic recombination in phage and bacteria. Insofar as the new theories and working hypotheses of that phase were concerned, however, we see that such ideas as the bacterial "key enzyme" for which infecting viruses were supposed to compete, the multiplication of the viral genome by independent subunits, genetic recombination in phage by "partial replicas" or "copy choice," and bacterial recombination by cell fusion and postzygotic elimination of genetic material did not stand the test of time. The last mistaken idea to be produced in the romantic phase, based not unreasonably on the finding of proteinaceous, DNA-free phage precursors during the eclipse period of phage growth, was that protein is the viral genetic material. This idea arose just a few months before Hershey and Martha Chase showed that the oppo-site is actually true-that the phagc DNA is the viral genome. This demonstration ushered in the end of the romantic phase, since it presaged ominously that, in the study of phage, no paradoxes might crop up and come into sharper focus after all. For the fundamental problem of self-reproduction could now be restated in terms of two functions, "autocatalytic" and "heterocatalytic," of the phage DNA. By means of the former, the phage DNA replicates itself several hundredfold to generate the genome of its progeny, and by means of the latter, the phage DNA induces, or presides over, the synthesis of the virus-specific proteins that govern the reactions of vegetative phage growth and furnish the soma of its progeny. About 1963 the last, or academic, phase of the informational school began. By that time many of the details of the genetic code were known, the colinearity of nucleotide sequence in DNA and amino acid sequence in protein had been finally proved, the structural details of the transfer RNA (Crick's postulated adaptor) and the mechanism by which it combines with its cognate amino acids had been worked out, and the general enzymatic and informational mechanisms connected with the synthesis of DNA, RNA, and protein had been elucidated. All hope that paradoxes would still turn up in the study of heredity had been abandoned long ago, and what remained now was the need to iron out the details.
Some of these details still represent formidable problems, such as that of understanding the processes responsible for the orderly morphogenesis of the fertilized egg into complex and highly differentiated multicellular organisms. But now that some reasonable molecular mechanisms for cellular differentiation can at least be imagined, the likelihood that the explanation of development of the embryo will lead to the "other laws" seems to have greatly diminished, and with this denouement has diminished also the appeal of embryology as an area of romantic strife. Indeed, we now seem to be close to an understanding of one special case of cellular differentiation, that of the antibody response of vertebrates (12), thanks to the application of the notions of the central dogma. There also still remains the matter of the origin of life, which, as we now see, could not possibly have been solved prior to the promulgation of the central dogma. Though there is no guarantee, of course, that the first self-reproducing genetic materials formed in the primordial soup of ancient oceans were nucleic acid, or any polymers even resembling polynucleotides, it has now become clear at least that probing into the origin of the genetic code-into ways in which it could have arisen without, like Athena, having sprung full-blown from Zeus's head-is likely to be a most profitable attack on this problem. Perhaps a paradox may still be hidden here, but unless extraterrestrial life becomes available for study, it is difficult to see how such a paradox connected with the origin of life could ever come into sufficient focus to reveal "other" physical laws.
The Last Frontier
There now seems to remain only one major frontier of biological inquiry for which reasonable molecular mechanisms still cannot be even imagined: the higher nervous system. Its fantastic attributes continue to pose a problem as hopelessly difficult and intractably complex as the hereditary mechanism did e generation ago. And the higher nervous system does, of course, present the most ancient and best-known paradoxes in the history of human thought: the relation of mind to matter, or of free will to determinism. Bohr had thought that the principle of complementarity would be of help in fathoming the nature of this relation also (6):
The recognition of the limitation of mechanical ideas in atomic physics would much rather seem suited to conciliate the apparently contrasting points of view which mark physiology and psychology. Indeed the necessity of considering the interaction between the measuring instruments and the object under investigation in atomic mechanics corresponds closely to the peculiar difficulties, met with in psychological analyses, which arise from the fact that the mental content is invariably altered when the attention is concentrated on any single feature of it. .... Indeed, from our point of view, the feeling of the freedom of the will must be considered as a trait peculiar to conscious life, the material parallel of which must be sought in organic functions, which permit neither a causal mechanical description nor a physical investigation sufficiently thoroughgoing for a well-defined application of the statistical law of atomic mechanics. This attitude would mean nothing less than that searching for a "molecular" explanation of consciousness is a waste of time, since the physiological processes responsible for this wholly private experience will be seen to degenerate into seemingly quite ordinary, workaday reactions-no more and no less fascinating than those that occur in, say, the liver-long before the molecular level has been reached. Despite this simple, though psychologically possibly unsatisfying, resolution of the mind-matter paradox, increasing numbers of veteran molecular biologists of the informational, but few of the structural, school are now turning toward the nervous system in the hope that its study may soon enter a romantic phase, similar to that which attended the birth of molecular genetics. Thus, now that the success of the informational school has made molecular genetics an academic discipline, one can expect that in the coming years students of the nervous system, rather than geneticists, will form the avant-garde of biological research. And the inability to even imagine any reasonable molecular explanation for conscious life still offers some hope that some "other laws of physics" may yet turn up through study of the nervous system. But it is also possible that study of the nervous system is bringing us to the limits of human understanding, in that the brain may not be capable, in the last analysis, of providing an explanation for itself. Indeed, Bohr ended his 1932 lecture with the thought, . . . without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that any analysis of the very concept of an explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
Perhaps this then is the paradox: there exist processes which, though they clearly obey the laws of physics, can never be explained.
